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1 Introduction
The benefits ascribed to historic preservation are manifold in terms of linking the
past with the present. Historic resources 1 embody environmental and psychological value
that generates social and economic benefits (Sable & Kling, 2001). From a social standpoint,
many perceive that historic designation confers honorific status or prestige (Noonan, 2007;
Noonan & Krupka, 2011). Moreover, designation status is an amenity that improves both
neighborhoods and surrounding areas (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Zahirovic-Herbert &
Chatterjee, 2012). The communal effort to preserve these assets fosters social cohesion (Sable
& Kling, 2001), thereby establishing the fabric of designated communities (Rose, 1981, p.
480; Noonan, 2007, p. 18; Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010). Historic districts often receive credit
for providing economic benefits to property owners and the overall community by spurring
investment and development (Wojno, 1991; Listokin, Listokin, & Lahr, 1998; Sable & Kling,
2001). Various accounts show that historic designation raises property values (Ford, 1989;
Clark & Herrin, 1997; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Leichenko, Coulson, & Listokin, 2001;
Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Noonan, 2007; Zahirovic-Herbert & Chatterjee, 2012), generates
tourism, and creates jobs (Wojno, 1991; Listokin et al., 1998; Sable & Kling, 2001).
These benefits, both tangible and intangible, spill over into adjacent undesignated
neighborhoods (Wojno, 1991; Listokin et al., 1998; Zahirovic-Herbert & Gibler, 2014). The
constraints on property use along with the economic merits of historic districts are critical
points in the debate over preservation policies. Although preservationists acknowledge the
impact of preservation laws on property use (Rypkema, 2000), they assert that these policies
serve the public interest (Noonan, 2007, p. 27; Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010).
1.1 Early Beginnings and Ongoing Controversies
Preservation statutes were initially based on architectural and aesthetic considerations
(Loflin, Rankin, Marcus, & Goldstone, 1971; Rose, 1981). Early efforts entirely depended on
raising private funds to protect buildings of historic distinction from demolition (See Boge &
Boge, 1993, chap. 2). Relying solely on acquisition, this endeavor proved difficult to achieve
prompting the legislative efforts of the movement (Loflin et al., 1971, p. 363).
Historic preservation remains a controversial subject that raises ethical 2 as well as
legal concerns over ownership, maintenance, and availability of designated properties (Rose,
1981; Warren, 1999; Uzdavinis, 2007; Lindsay, 2012; Matthes, 2016). The effect on ownership
by preservation depends on whether the policy is based on an incentive or regulatory
framework (Asabere, Huffman, & Mehdian, 1994). In cities, the regulatory approach to
initiate preservation policies typically occurs in the form of historic districting (Ford, 1989,
p. 354). A recurring argument made by critics is that these regulations intentionally infringe
on property rights and undermine both improvements and investment within designated
districts (Asabere & Huffman, 1994b, p. 397; Heintzelman & Altieri, 2013, p. 546).
1 Historic resources encompass all assets having cultural, historical, and architectural significance. These
assets can include physical structures, natural scenery, and other tangible or intangible attributes of a
community.
2 These issues arise over what to preserve and whether preservation should trump access and property
rights.
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1.2 Who Benefits?
Serious disagreement exists regarding which segment of the public actually benefits
from preservation policies. Critics have characterized historic preservation as having vaunted
benefits that are inimical to low-income and elderly households (Rose, 1981; Schneider, 2001;
Uzdavinis, 2007; Glaeser, 2010). Edward Glaser, prominent urban economist, describes
the preservationists of New York City as “[t]he well-heeled denizens of historic districts
convincing the Landmarks Preservation Commission to stop taller structures have become
the urban equivalent of those restrictive suburbanites who want to mandate five-acre lot
sizes in order to keep out the riffraff” (cited in Byrne, 2012, p. 668). Furthermore, historic
designation may impose obligatory structural maintenance standards on property owners. 3
The preservation ordinance usually requires that alteration plans are approved prior to the
commencement of any work on the structure. The enforcement of the ordinance typically
seeks restitution by imposing civil penalties on property owners. Homeowners that are
susceptible to displacement may find the cost of complying with maintenance obligations
too burdensome (Schneider, 2001; Coulson & Leichenko, 2004). 4 Similarly, the benefit of
higher building and land valuations stemming from historic designation can increase property
taxes, which may further displace homeowners (Leichenko et al., 2001; Zahirovic-Herbert &
Chatterjee, 2012) and cause inauspicious neighborhood change (Glaeser, 2010).
Preservationists have also received criticism for prioritizing the protection of certain
heritages over others 5 (Newsom, 1971; Bell, 2013). Newsom (1971) writes that historic
preservation has had a detrimental effect on black households in Georgetown, Washington
D.C., and their historic contributions to the area. In this regard, historic preservation is
comparable to gentrification for adversely affecting minorities (Newsom, 1971) and households
of lower socioeconomic status (Rose, 1981; Schneider, 2001).
1.3 Preservation Laws and Property Use Restrictions
The first requisite of any preservation policy is coherently specifying the criteria
that would establish “historical significance” (Robinson, 1981; Byrne, 2012). Herein lies the
challenge of drafting preservation laws. Legislators must properly define the legal notion
of “historic”, along with a procedure to identify such assets (Rose, 1981; Robinson, 1981).
Upon designation, the property owner is instantly subject to regulations that guide future
use and renovation decisions.
Land-use controls, which typically follow historic designation, restrict demolition
and any alteration 6 that may compromise the architectural integrity of the designated
structure. The restrictions that follow designation encumber efficient use of the property
within designated areas, thereby hampering the growth of the housing supply (Glaeser,
2010). The argument is that the best use of a property today may not be its best use
in the future (Asabere & Huffman, 1994a). Hence, owners of designated buildings must
3 These obligations vary by jurisdiction.
4 Provided that these property owners were neither offered nor qualified to receive tax breaks or other
subsidies.
5 Bell (2013) discusses the general politics of heritage preservation in several countries.
6 The terms “alterations” and “improvements” will be used interchangeably.
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accept functional and physical quiescence (Asabere, Hachey, & Grubaugh, 1989, p. 183).
Allen Greenough, the then-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, expressed this
sentiment in 1962 via a letter to the New York Times : “Does it make any sense to attempt
to preserve a building merely as a ‘monument’ when it no longer serves the utilitarian needs
for which it was erected?” 7 (Wood, 2008, p. 312).
The regulatory part of preservation policies finds public justification in the threat
that the free market poses to historic structures (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Rypkema,
1994, cited in Noonan, 2007). Advocates have since touted the economic benefits of historic
districts to bolster their legislative efforts (Sable & Kling, 2001). Likewise, these benefits
give policymakers a rationale to employ historic preservation as a policy tool in urban
development initiatives (Wojno, 1991; Listokin et al., 1998; Slaughter, 1997, cited in Coulson
& Leichenko, 2001).
Improving the existing stock of housing is a substantial economic activity and a
significant part of the nation’s overall construction industry. In addition to new construction,
alterations form a vital source of housing supply affecting both the quantity and quality of
the existing housing stock (DiPasquale, 1999). The Joint Center for Housing Studies (2017)
of Harvard University reports that nominal expenditures on improvements, maintenance, and
repairs have increased annually since 2009, with an estimated $221 billion spent in 2015. 8
Private ownership constitutes the majority of the housing stock; hence, property owners have
great influence over the quality and quantity of the supply (Fallis, 1985, p. 62; DiPasquale,
1999, p. 1). Given a time of rising inequality, sustained efforts must take place to ensure
affordable housing. Better insight into the housing supply adjustment mechanism would
aid in formulating an astute policy (Mendelsohn, 1977, p. 469). If historic districts are
indeed a stimulus for urban development and investment (Noonan, 2007), then it would
certainly aid efforts to succor this emerging global crisis (See Wetzstein, 2017). While
the environmental value of historical assets is broadly recognized, the empirical merit of
these economic externalities is more disputatious (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001). Particularly,
research concerning its impact on the renovation decisions of nearby homeowners has received
little attention.
1.4 The Catalyst Effect of Historic Preservation
Government commitment to enforce the preservation ordinance reduces investment
risk and ensures owners that homes in districts will not deteriorate (Ford, 1989). This
provision increases renovation and investment within designated districts (Lockard & Hinds,
1983; Listokin et al., 1998). The amenity of neighborhood stabilization may give nearby
homeowners an incentive to invest in their properties, on the other hand, it may induce
other courses of action.
For homes within districts, preservation is beneficial for homeowners so long as it
is unsurpassed by the loss incurred from the restrictions of the ordinance. The effect of
7 This letter was written in response to the campaign that was formed to preserve the original Pennsylvania
Station. This significant event will be discussed in the next section.
8 The Leading Indicator or Remodeling Activity (LIRA) was designed to estimate current and future
home-improvement expenditures. Readers are encouraged to visit http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files/n07-1_bendimerad_0.pdf for more information on LIRA (last visited June 16, 2017).
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historic districts on nearby undesignated homes, however, is not as straightforward as these
externalities can be capitalized through an entirely different mechanism. Zahirovic-Herbert
& Gibler (2014) highlighted that designation may affect both property values as well as the
buying process. Also, Byrne (2012) has noted that the aesthetics of preserved neighborhoods
spread development to new areas just outside their boundary. Simply by the delineation
of the historic district boundary, homeowners in surrounding neighborhoods experience
improved conditions as a result of their proximity to that boundary. These property owners
are essentially free-riding off a public good since they are under no regulatory obligation
to maintain the structure and can reap the benefits of the amenity without incurring the
regulatory costs (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; See Sable & Kling, 2001). The claim of historic
districts catalyzing rehabilitation is prevalent in the preservation literature. This strongly
motivates new research into the external effect of historic districts on renovation decisions
of homeowners both in and outside the historic district boundary.
The purpose of this study is to present an empirical cross-sectional analysis of the
relationship between historic district designation and renovation activity of single-family
homes in New York City. Preservationists describe the catalyst effect of historic preservation
as a positive spillover to the renovation activity of adjoining neighborhoods (Wojno, 1991;
Rypkema, 1994, cited in Listokin et al., 1998; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001). However, existing
research has not sufficiently addressed either the existence or the strength of this relationship.
Instead, only anecdotal observations support the proposed phenomenon (Listokin et al., 1998,
p. 440).
The results of the analysis found that historic preservation does not inhibit the
renovation activity of single-family homeowners. However, contrary to the claims made
by proponents, it does not give a powerful incentive. The results suggest that urban
development or renewal initiatives can incorporate historic preservation, but the effects on the
improvement of the housing stock and renovation activity among residential homeowners are
overstated by preservation advocates, at least as it relates to owners of single-family homes.
2 Background
The historic preservation movement established an active presence across the United
States in the early part of the 20th century. 9 During the post-WWII economic boom, the
demolition of several architectural treasures by urban renewal projects and federally funded
initiatives triggered an increase in activism. The release of the seminal report created by
the Special Committee on Historic Preservation of the United States Conference of Mayors
in 1966 would set the agenda, prompting both federal and local governments to advance
policies to protect historically or aesthetically significant buildings. 10 The political efforts
of preservationists eventually were rewarded by government intervention, much to the ire
of developers and other real estate interests. The movement has since evolved from solely
protecting buildings to preserving the cultural heritage of communities for the benefit of
9 Early achievements include the nation’s first historic district in Charleston, South Carolina, designated
in 1931.
10 The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 was passed within months following the release of With
Heritage So Rich.
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subsequent generations.
Historic Preservation in New York City
Historic preservation in New York City has a rich history dating back to the late 19th
century when Andrew Harwell Green founded The American Scenic and Historic Preservation
Society in 1895 (Wood, 2008, p. 17). The creation of the Landmarks Preservation Commission
(LPC) in 1962 gave civic activists 11 an initial vehicle to protect the city’s architectural
heritage from demolition (Wood, 2008, chap. 11). However, the lack of legal authority for
the LPC meant that in reality, any efforts at preservation were nonexistent. The outcome
was a failure to prevent the loss of several iconic structures. This ultimately prompted
legislative action intended to promulgate effective legal authority for preservation.
The demolition of the original Pennsylvania Station marked a significant moment in
the advancement of preservation for New York City (Wood, 2008, chap. 1). Far from the
Beaux-Arts paragon at its height of popularity as a center of transportation, the demolition
of the prominent structure in 1963 was not enough for the city to act for another two years
(Wood, 2008, p. 333). The razing of the Brokaw mansion in 1965, despite its designation
two years earlier (Wood, 2008, p. 333), prompted Mayor Robert F. Wagner to sign the
Landmarks Preservation Law 12 that same year (Wood, 2008, p. 361). The law established
the LPC as a municipal agency with the authority to protect the city’s cultural and historical
assets. 13 Within the same year, the city designated its first historic district in Brooklyn.
The city’s Landmarks Law became a notable legislative accomplishment to advance historic
preservation following the Supreme Court decision to uphold the statute in 1978 entirely on
aesthetic considerations. 14
Although the LPC does not regulate height 15 , the impact of preservation through
regulation has adversely affected development and investment within designated districts
(Glaeser, 2010; Been, Ellen, Gedal, Glaeser, & McCabe, 2016). In an article in City
Journal, Glaeser (2010) details his concern that historic preservation is stifling development
in New York City. His principal thesis is that cities must be diverse in order to thrive and
that the persistence of unaffordable housing will imperil that prospect (Byrne, 2012). For
dynamic real estate markets with limited housing for low-income residents, predominantly
urban markets like New York City, soaring housing prices present a genuine threat of
societal homogenization where the bulk of the inhabitants are both elite and wealthy. The
ubiquitousness of historic districts was adduced by Glaeser as contributing to the rising
cost of housing by restricting development of new housing to meet demand, and, therefore,
exacerbating the affordability crisis.
Over one hundred districts containing over 30,000 properties have been designated
throughout the city in all five boroughs since the first designation of a historic district
11 A luminary figure during that period was Jane Jacobs, who had risen to prominence following the
release of The Death and Life of Great American Cities in 1961.
12 New York City Administrative Code §25-301.
13 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §25-302.
14 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §25-304.
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occurred in 1965. 16 Interestingly, there have been many district extensions since 1981. 17
The presence of historic district extensions, or expansions, begs the question of why these
properties were overlooked in the initial designation process. Listokin et al. (1998) offer the
following explanation: “the process by which one neighborhood is designated as a historic
district, encouraging rehabilitation in an adjacent neighborhood that may ultimately itself be
designated, in turn catalyzing rehabilitation in yet another area.” This suggests that historic
preservation, by virtue of designation, serves as a catalyst to increase renovation activity in
adjacent undesignated areas because property owners are seeking designation status for their
neighborhood. As a result, historic designation should incentivize property owners to invest
in their homes. The spillover effect, therefore, should be a function of propinquity since
nearby properties are more likely to capture these benefits than would those farther away.
3 Literature Review
Historic preservation is an interdisciplinary subject among jurisprudence, philosophy,
and economics. The subject touches upon several economic concepts and theories apart from
being a sub-discipline in its own right. In contrast to other areas of economic research, studies
examining the spillover effects of historic designation on renovation activity are meager. This
is not a sign of disinterest, rather it is more a case of the richness and complexity of the
subject making comprehensive studies hard to achieve. This study draws on the historic
preservation and renovation literature to examine the relationship between historic district
designation and the renovation decisions of owners of single-family homes. Each topic will
be separately discussed in the following literature review.
3.1 Renovations
Research into the mechanics of the housing supply has produced an exiguous level of
literature. The few empirical studies conducted in this area have thus far provided equivocal
findings pertaining to neighborhood and housing attributes. Analysis of the housing supply
has largely been encumbered by the complexities of the market as well as the attributes of the
commodity itself (Quigley, 1979, cited in Fallis, 1985; DiPasquale, 1999). This is especially
true for household renovation decisions. Limited or otherwise unavailable data has also been
cited as a reason for the dearth of research on renovation decisions (Mendelsohn, 1977; Fallis,
1985; Boehm & Ihlanfeldt, 1986; Montgomery, 1992; DiPasquale, 1999). In recent years, the
literature has sharpened to include more sophisticated analyses that model homeowners’
decisions. This review is predominantly concerned with the impact of neighborhood quality
with a primary emphasis on more recent work that has accounted for this measure in
non-linear regression analysis.
Theoretical analysis dominated early research and was primarily concerned with
modeling factors of maintenance. Sweeney (1974a; 1974b; 1974c) produced papers that
16 NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, About LPC, https://www1.
nyc.gov/site//about/about-lpc.page (last visited June 12, 2017).
17 The first designated extension occurred in the neighborhood of Chelsea, NYC. The report can be found
at the following link http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/lpc/lp/1088.pdf (last visited June 1, 2017).
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concentrated on various aspects of housing markets, two of which focus on the stock of
housing (1974b; 1974c). Sweeney (1974b) develops a conceptual framework to model the
determinants of maintenance using optimal control theory. However, he neither offered an
explanation on how changes in local amenities affect the optimal level of maintenance nor
employed his model empirically. The author’s seminal work was noteworthy for its theoretical
contributions to the subject and for producing a set of hypotheses that would spur future
research in the field.
Early empirical work has mainly analyzed improvement expenditures. Mendelsohn
(1977) authored the first empirical study on the subject of improvement. He found that
household characteristics and age are important determinants of improvement. Although he
omitted a control for neighborhood quality, Mendelsohn (1977) discussed the importance of
the measure in determining renovation expenditures. Years later, Mayer (1981) focused on
rehabilitation decisions of landlords in Berkeley, California. This study is notable for drawing
on data for a particular housing market. He found that neighborhood characteristics have
a significant effect on investment. These prior works suffered from numerous limitations,
mostly due to the lack of data present at the time (Mendelsohn, 1977, p. 460; Mayer, 1981,
p. 77).
The research following Mendelsohn (1977) and Mayer (1981) examined the renovation
activities of homeowners using various data, but mostly found conflicting results regarding
the effect of neighborhood quality (Shear, 1983; Boehm & Ihlanfeldt, 1986; Montgomery,
1992). Shear (1983) uses the American Housing Survey (AHS) in his analysis, but finds
only age and structural soundness as significant determinants. The effects of neighborhood
quality are insignificant in his logit analysis, and he attributes this finding to measurement
error in the AHS dataset. Boehm and Ihlanfeldt (1986) expanded on the work of Mendelsohn
(1977) to include a control for neighborhood quality. The authors found significant impacts
of neighborhood quality that concern safety and the condition of buildings in the area.
Montgomery (1992) utilizes the AHS for 1985. She includes a 10-point scale measure in
her analysis based on the homeowner’s assessment of neighborhood quality. Her mildly
significant findings indicated that property owners are less likely to improve in better quality
neighborhoods.
Much of the early empirical work has consistently found age to be a significant
predictor on the likelihood of renovation. Apart from Mayer (1981), these studies have
used either the U.S. Census or AHS. While these authors have acknowledged a relationship
between improved conditions and the likelihood to improve, none have been able to decisively
conclude the exact nature of the relationship. Helms (2003) challenged the findings of
previous research that neighborhood quality and local amenities are insignificant determinants
of residential renovation. He aggregated five years of renovation expenditures, in Chicago
over the years 1995 to 2000, for 31,744 out of a sample of 403,760 buildings. He finds that
neighborhood amenities, such as distance to city parks, encourages renovations, whereas
increases in distance from public transportation decrease the likelihood of renovation.
Recent work continues to produce mixed findings regarding the true impact of
neighborhood quality on household renovations. Culp (2011) builds an index using micro
data on homes located in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. He includes attributes such as views,
distance to parks, and other environmental factors in his construction. His results support
the position that environmental factors have a positive impact on the decision by homeowners
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to renovate. Helms (2012) expanded on his earlier work in Chicago to investigate the effect
of endogenous feedbacks between renovation and neighborhood quality. In contrast to his
(2003) previous findings, many of the explanatory variables lose their explanatory power
once a control for endogenous effects is added to the model. His findings demonstrate that
controls for exogenous neighborhood quality, such as amenities, essentially serve as proxies
in the absence of a control for endogenous spatial effects. He concludes that most of these
contextual variables are not true determinants of renovation. Munneke and Womack (2015)
produced the most recent study on the subject in which they examined the decision to
renovate or tear down. The authors estimate a multinomial logit where they also found no
significant effects for many of their controls for neighborhood quality.
3.2 Historic Preservation
For several decades, historic preservation has been an active topic of research in
housing and urban economics (Leichenko et al., 2001; Zahirovic-Herbert & Gibler, 2014).
Empirical work has considered a number of real estate markets, but the literature has mostly
focused on the amenity values that are capitalized into property, land, and appraised values
(Zahirovic-Herbert & Gibler, 2014, p. 113). Research on price effects typically estimates
hedonic price models (See Rosen, 1974, cited in Heintzelman & Altieri, 2013) using either
sales or appraisal data. Longitudinal studies have employed various statistical techniques,
such as difference-in-difference (Noonan, 2007; Heintzelman & Altieri, 2013; Been et al.,
2016) 18 , 2SLS (Noonan & Krupka, 2011), and 3SLS (Zahirovic-Herbert & Gibler, 2014).
Many studies have yielded conflicting results (Leichenko et al., 2001; Heintzelman
& Altieri, 2013) but typically find positive effects of historic district designation on property
values (Ford, 1989; Clark & Herrin, 1997; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Leichenko et al., 2001;
Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Noonan, 2007; Zahirovic-Herbert & Chatterjee, 2012). 19 Ford (1989)
found significant positive price premiums for single-family homes in Baltimore, Maryland.
Schaeffer and Millerick (1991) found that preservation policies yielded a price discount for
property owners in Chicago, Illinois, noting that the effect on property values may depend
on whether a property is federally or locally designated. Several papers concentrating on
the impact of preservation policies were written by Asabere and Huffman (1991; 1994a;
1994b) that were mostly critical of historic district designation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Their work focused on the effects of both federal and local designation. The authors
found a premium associated with federal preservation policies on land (1991) and residential
market values (1994b), but found that historic facade easements, i.e., the restrictions that
are associated with local preservation laws, negatively impact value (1994a). In the same
city, Asabere et al. (1994) separated between federal and local preservation policies in a
study examining the impact of preservation on small apartment buildings. They found a
24% discount associated with local designation while the results for federal designation was
insignificant. Asabere et al. (1994) concluded that the difference was explained by the austere
restrictions of local historic designation as practiced in Philadelphia and limited incentives
18 The study refers to more recent difference-in-difference studies that employ hedonic price models to
assess the implicit price of attributes belonging to a property. See Leichenko et al. (2001).
19 Leichenko et al. (2001) wrote a comprehensive review of the literature that concludes that homes within
the confines of historic districts typically sell at a premium.
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that were offered to property owners. Heudorfer (1975, cited in Rickman, 2009) is credited
with the earliest study analyzing the economic impact of historic preservation on property
values in New York City. The author found a neutral effect using a difference-in-difference
that was based on comparing averages of the growth rate of property prices in historic
districts with those that were undesignated (Leichenko et al., 2001). While novel for its
time, the study omits several factors independent of designation that explain changes in
property values 20 (Leichenko et al., 2001, p. 1975). The studies mentioned above have
a number of limitations, but each has overlooked the external impacts of preservation on
nearby undesignated properties.
The internal and external effects of historic designation on property values also have
produced conflicting results. Clark and Herrin (1997) used sales price data from Sacramento,
California, and found a 17.3% positive effect of designation on property values for structures
within districts. For undesignated buildings, they found a 20% discount for buildings located
across the street from the boundary and no significant premiums for properties a block away.
In contrast, Coulson and Leichenko (2001) use appraisal data to estimate several models
to account for differences between national and local designation, the impact of local tax
breaks, and external effects in Albilene, Texas. They find positive economic benefits for both
designated properties and nearby homes of 15-17.6% and 0.14%, respectively. Coulson and
Lahr (2005) analyzed appreciation rates for several neighborhoods in Memphis, Tennessee,
and found that designation increased property values 14-23% higher than in comparable
neighborhoods. Additionally, they found that older properties within historic districts benefit
as much or less than newer buildings. Leichenko et al. (2001) carried out an extensive study
analyzing price premiums for nine cities in Texas. They find price premiums between 5-20%
in seven cities and larger premiums in districts that were less restrictive.
Endogeneity plagues historic preservation studies due to the omission of factors
that are correlated with the structure attaining designation status as well as the designation
process itself. Neighborhoods experiencing increased renovation activity can attract property
owners and activists that support historic preservation (Noonan, 2007; Been et al., 2016).
Noonan (2007) performed a repeat sales fixed effects hedonic analysis to control for unobserved
attributes of housing using property transactional data in Chicago from 1990-1999. He
found a positive premium ranging from 3-11% on attached homes. Heintzelman and Altieri
(2013) adopted the same approach in a study examining the impact of preservation on home
prices in Boston. However, they found significant negative internal impacts of designation
and no significant external effects. In another study, Noonan and Krupka (2011) used an
instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for potential endogeneity of the designation
process. They found negative price impacts in designated districts and small negative
external effects. Zahirovic-Herbert and Chatterjee (2012) addressed the issue of heterogeneity
in property value impacts by estimating a quantile regression. They found that preservation
has significant price premiums for designated homes in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Likewise,
they found positive significant spillover effects for nearby residential properties.
The majority of empirical research on the subject of preservation has explored
the impact of designation on property values. There are noteworthy papers that have
addressed the effects of preservation on neighborhood transition (Coulson & Leichenko,
20 These factors include attributes belonging to the property.
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2004; McCabe & Ellen, 2016), the external effects of designation on the selling duration
of nearby homes (Zahirovic-Herbert & Gibler, 2014) and new construction activity (Been et
al., 2016). Coulson and Leichenko (2004) found no evidence that preservation had any effect
on neighborhood composition in Fort Worth, Texas. The results of that study found little
effect on vacancy rates or rates of owner occupancy and no significant effect on neighborhood
composition. The authors concluded that historic designation neither leads to gentrification
nor has any considerable effect on economic development. The findings illustrate that
historic preservation may not be an effective policy instrument. McCabe & Ellen (2016)
uncovered different results in a study based in New York City. The authors found that
residents in historic districts experience an increase in socioeconomic status post-designation
in comparison to other neighborhoods. However, they admit that the results cannot be
explained by preservation alone and offer several explanations (See pp. 143-144). The
authors suggest that increases in homeownership rates post-designation might be the result
of conversions. Zahirovic-Herbert and Gibler (2014) examine an entirely different external
effect of historic preservation that had not been previously considered. They found significant
evidence that selling duration captures a portion of the capitalization of preservation. The
authors found that single-family homes that were nearby historic districts sold faster on
average than those farther away. Also, they found no such evidence of shorter selling duration
for designated properties and no significant evidence of price premiums for nearby properties.
A more recent study by Been et al. (2016) examined the impact of preservation on new
construction activity and property values in New York City using micro data between the
years 1974 to 2009. The authors found that designation had a significant negative effect
on new construction post-designation by as much as 14% per year. However, they do not
conclude that designation reduced supply overall in the city based on the results of the
study. With respect to price premiums, they found significant effects of historic designation
on property values both within designated districts and just outside the boundary. The
strength of the premium is especially high in areas where the value of the option to redevelop
is low. Not a great deal is known about the effect of preservation on renovation activity as
there are only two empirical studies (Laska, Seaman, & McSeveney, 1982; Lockard & Hinds,
1983) that have investigated the topic.
Laska et al. (1982) analyzed renovation activity for 68 census tracts in New Orleans,
Louisiana, from 1970 to 1978. Their analysis consisted of estimating three stepwise regressions
for the existence, extent, and timing of renovation activity. The authors found that proximity
to a historic district was a modest predictor of the extent of a renovation but a weak predictor
of its timing. Lockard and Hinds (1983) examined restoration rates of homes within and
outside the confines of the Old and Historic District of Charleston, South Carolina. They
performed an analysis using sixteen years of building permit information from 1960 to 1975
properties, where properties were segmented into three groups based on their architectural
quality. The authors found that restoration rates were significantly higher for homes within
historic districts, but that the rates decreased with architectural quality. Additionally,
restoration rates for homes located within districts that had high architectural quality were
22.9% and 18.3% for those located outside districts over the sixteen-year period. However,
the results for the difference were inconclusive.
This study extends the previous research on historic preservation by considering a
separate external effect. Furthermore, neither of the studies mentioned has accounted for the
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influence of neighbors as it relates to property investment. If historic designation serves as
a catalyst for renovation in nearby communities, then a building’s propinquity to a historic
district should increase the likelihood that a renovation will occur. In order to gain insight
into the impact of historic district designation on renovation activity, an analysis of how
preservation influences the renovation decisions of homeowners must be performed. This
paper will bridge the gap between the literature on historic preservation and renovation
by evaluating how historic district designation affects the renovation decisions of property
owners. In addition to making a theoretical contribution, I use new data to estimate the
determinants of renovation decisions for New York City.
4 Theory
Housing, as a durable and heterogeneous good, introduces a notion of quality that
challenges theoretical analyses of housing markets (Sweeney, 1974a; 1974b; 1974c). The
supply of housing is sourced by either new development or the existing stock. Producers
range from firms to individuals. Thus, suppliers of housing are a diverse set of agents whose
production decisions are separated by their underlying motives.
Owner-occupiers can assume the role of both supplier and consumer. Homeowners
may decide to consume some portion of housing services as their residence and supply the
remaining portion on the market (DiPasquale, 1999). In this situation, objectives can be
modeled either as a joint consumption-investment decision in an inter-temporal framework
or static utility optimization problem (Fallis, 1985, pp. 62-63). Consequently, theoretical
contributions often rely on strict assumptions. This study is no different in that regard
and will rely on similar assumptions to model the determinants of residential renovation
decisions.
Sable and Kling (2001) define historic built resources as a “ tangible construction
embodying value that is both historically and socially determined.” For this reason, historic
preservation is often characterized as a public good 21 because of the prestige or nostalgia it
imparts on owners and consumers. 22 In their presentation of the “double public good” model,
Sable and Kling (2001) highlight that market intervention is necessary in order to attain
social efficiency. Therefore, government plays a prominent role in enforcing preservation
policies and maintenance obligations which has implications on the renovation decisions of
property owners, both within and outside of historic districts.
Lockard and Hinds (1983) describes the “investor’s dilemma” by making an analogy
to a classic case in game theory: “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 23 In the “investor’s dilemma”,
an owner’s decision to improve their property takes into account the improvement decisions
of all their neighbors. Similar to the outcome in “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”, the optimal
decision for homeowners is to make no improvements to their property because they benefit
21 Sable and Kling (2001) model historic assets as a pure public good.
22 Consumers in this context refer to any individual that attains satisfaction from viewing a preserved
structure, living in a historic district, etc. Readers are referred to Sable and Kling (2001) and Heintzelman
and Altieri (2013) for an insightful discussion on the characterization of historic preservation as a public
good.
23 Davis and Whinston (1961, cited in Lockard & Hinds, 1983) were the first to reference “The Prisoner’s
Dilemma” to explain why urban blight can develop and persist.
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from the investments made by their neighbors (Lockard & Hinds, 1983). If all neighbors
decide to employ this strategy, then everyone is worse off than if they had all agreed to invest.
Historic districts are attributed with stabilizing or revitalizing neighborhoods because of the
maintenance obligations that are imposed on owners of designated properties. (Ford, 1989;
Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991). Owners of designated properties internalize the spillover of
maintenance (Lockard & Hinds, 1983). By reducing investment risk, the regulatory approach
to preservation policies solves the investor’s dilemma. The notion that historic preservation
serves as a catalyst for the rehabilitation of nearby areas is a consequence of solving for
the interdependencies of investment decisions among property owners in designated areas.
But this outcome may not apply to nearby homeowners located in undesignated districts.
Theory suggests that these owners have no incentive to improve their buildings as they
already benefit by being near a designated district. Hence, a model to understand the
spillover effects of historic preservation on investment decisions must explicitly account for
this interdependency.
Brueckner (2003) proposed the “spillover model” to model strategic interaction
among governments while expanding on earlier work by Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993, cited
in Brueckner, 2003). The household renovation model presented by Helms (2003), which
is based on the capital-stock adjustment model used earlier by Mayer (1981), describes
the behavior of adjusting the holdings of housing stock by improvement of the existing
dwelling. The theoretical framework of Bruecker’s (2003) “spillover model” allowed Helms
(2012) to include the interdependencies of investment decisions of neighbors in his earlier
model. Munneke and Womack (2015) recently proposed the general redevelopment model
which allows for the outcome of redevelopment to occur either by renovations or tear downs.
The authors expanded on the work of Helms (2003) by extending the model to allow for an
additional outcome. 24
This study relies heavily on the housing renovation model that was extended by
Helms (2012) and follows the general derivation and all notations. I modify Helms’s (2012)
model by combining elements of the “double public good” (Sable & Kling, 2001) model
in order to account for the spillover effect of designation on the renovation decisions of
homeowners that are not subjected to the restrictions of the preservation ordinance. For
tractability, the model assumes perfect capital markets, perfect foresight, and that housing is
a homogeneous good 25 . The following presentation is a static utility optimization framework
in which the agents are homeowners that consume all the housing services that are produced
by their property. Some of the more restrictive assumptions are later relaxed.
Theoretical Model
Following Helms (2003, 2012), consider a utility maximizing household that chooses
between housing services h, neighborhood quality n, and all other consumption goods z.
Let k0 denote the building’s initial level of investment made during renovation so that the
post-investment capital level is k0 + R. Assume that the post-renovation condition of the
building is given by the function c(b, k0 + R), where b is a vector of structural attributes
24 The authors model the outcome of negative investment as a “teardown”.
25 This assumption allows for the treatment of housing services as an explicit argument in the households
objective function. See Fallis (1985, pp. 27-28).
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inherent to the building. A building’s structural characteristics include area, age, number of
stories, and other attributes that would be unaffected by a renovation. The inclusion of b in
the building’s condition function c allows for the marginal return to housing investment to
depend on building type. For any building that undergoes a renovation, the change in the
building’s condition c is assumed to be positive, i.e., ∂c / ∂R > 0.
The total housing services h(q, c(b, k0 +R)) provided by a building can be expressed
as a function of its size q and condition c. 26 Increases in size and improved conditions is
associated with positive changes to the housing services provided, i.e. ∂h / ∂R > 0 and
∂h / ∂q > 0. The vector n is an explicit argument in the utility function allowing for
households to have different preferences for amenities and other neighborhood characteristics. 27
The utility function for households can be expressed as
u(h( q, c( b, k0 +R ) ), n, z), (1)
where z denotes a numeraire composite good. Let s = (q, b) denote the vector of structural
characteristics, then household preference can be rewritten as an indirect utility function
v(s, R, n, z). (2)
Renovation activity affects neighborhood quality (Helms, 2012, p. 303). In his
analysis of neighborhood endogenous effects, Helms (2012) highlights that n must capture
spillovers from nearby renovation activity. He separates the effects of neighborhood quality
and expresses neighborhood characteristics as the function
ni = n(ai, R−i), (3)
where exogenous effects are denoted by a andR−i denotes the level of investment of neighbors,
i.e., R−i ≡ {Rj | j 6= i}. I take a similar approach in order to include the influence of
historic district designation as an explicit argument.
Sable and Kling (2001) describes the “heritage experience” as the outcome that
follows from consuming historic assets. The “double public good” model is a general
equilibrium model developed by Sable and Kling (2001) in order to capture the range of
values 28 of preserved historic resources. This paper draws on certain aspects of the “double
public good” model in the modification of equation (3) to incorporate the spillover effects of
historic districts as a neighborhood characteristic.
As discussed above, historic districts are regarded as an amenity. Designation status
is often highly esteemed and considered to improve not only the area within the confines
of the district but also nearby surroundings. Let hdi indicate the designation status of
household i. Then, the influence of historic districts can be explicitly incorporated in (3) as
ni = n(ai, hdi, hd−i, R−i), (4)
26 The study uses either direct or proxy variables for structural attributes, size, and other building or
location characteristics.
27 The marginal utility of housing services, Uh, is likely to depend on n.
28 These values include environmental, social, and private market values of historic preservation.
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where hd−i is defined as the designation status of neighbors. The propinquity 29 to a historic
district can be expressed as a function of hd−i
H = f(hd−i) =
∑
j 6=i
hdj, (5)
where H is the sum of all neighbors that own designated homes. Then (4) for household i
becomes
ni = n(ai, hdi, H, R−i), (6)
Substituting (6) for n in (2) gives the objective function:
vi = v(si, n(ai, hdi, H, R−i)) (7)
for household i, which includes both the interdependence of housing investment and designation
status of neighbors.
The budget constraint for household i is given as yi = zi + p
k Ri, where income is
denoted by y, and the price of capital by pk. Households that maximize the utility function
given in (7) over z and r yield the necessary conditions:
∂u
∂h
∂h
∂c
∂c
∂R
= 0,
or equivalently,
∂v
∂Ri
= 0. (8)
Equation (8) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between home improvements and
consumption must equal the cost of capital. Moreover, equation (8) implicitly defines the
optimal housing capital investment:
R∗ = R(s, n, pk). (9)
The solution for (9) implicitly expresses a spatial reaction function (Brueckner, 2003) for
household i. Contemporaneous feedbacks by neighbors is captured in the determination of
household i’s level of investment. Thus, (9) is expressed as the equilibrium solution for R∗:
R∗i = R(si, n(ai, hdi, H, R−i), p
k). (10)
Total differentiation (10) and application of the chain rule is used to yield two
expressions of interest to the study:
∂Ri
∂R−i
= −
∂2v
∂Ri ∂R−i
∂2v
∂R2i
= −
∂2v
∂Ri ∂n
∂n
∂R−i
∂2v
∂R2i
, (11a)
29 Although proximity is often defined as distance, this paper relies on the broader definition of nearness
in space.
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and
∂Ri
∂H
= −
∂2v
∂Ri ∂H
∂2v
∂R2i
= −
∂2v
∂Ri ∂n
∂n
∂H
∂2v
∂R2i
. (11b)
Satisfaction of the second order condition implies that ∂
2v
∂R2i
< 0 in expressions (11a) and
(11b). The partial derivatives ∂n/∂R−i > 0, and ∂n/∂H > 0, since increases in renovation
activity improves neighborhood quality and historic districts is assumed to confer positive
externalities on nearby surroundings. Thus, the sign for equations (11a) and (11b) is
determined by the sign of the derivative ∂
2v
∂Ri ∂n
which indicates the change in the marginal
benefit of renovation from an increase in neighborhood quality.
The strength of the level of investment R∗ in equation (10) determines whether
a household will perform renovations. Naturally, R∗ can be considered as the household’s
propensity to renovate, since the level of investment is observed indirectly after the realization
of an improvement. Despite the consumer choice problem allowing for R to be negative, only
non negative values will be observed. 30 However, the scope and scale of a renovation project
that is performed by households is unknown for R∗ > 0. 31 Intuitively, households will not
undertake a renovation in the case of R < 0. Let r be an indicator for the presence or
absence of a renovation such that:
r =
{
1 if R∗ > 0,
0 if R∗ ≤ 0. (12)
Equation (12) will be used to motivate the empirical model for the study.
While the inclusion of a term to capture the spillover of preservation controls some
endogeneity of historic district designation, the model will not account for policy endogeneity.
Also, the static optimization framework ignores any temporal factors which may influence the
likelihood of renovation. Household renovation decisions are intrinsically dynamic processes
(Helms, 2003). Nevertheless, the benefit of this framework is that it allows for the explicit
treatment of the spatial spillovers of historic preservation and interdependence of renovation
activity among neighbors. 32
5 Methods
5.1 The SAR Probit Model
Along with heterogeneity and durability, housing is distinguished by spatial fixity
(see Fallis, 1985, pp. 5-11). Helms’s (2012) study on renovation decisions is notable for
its use of spatial econometrics to estimate endogenous neighborhood effects. Anselin (1988,
p. 11) wrote in his influential text on spatial econometrics that spatial dependence is “the
30 Presumably, negative values for level of investment R are considered to be “disinvestment” in the
building that can take the form of demolition, or deterioration. Montgomery (1992) defines “moving down”
to describe disinvestment by homeowners deciding to move in order to reduce their holdings of housing stock.
31 A large level investment does not necessarily imply a large project.
32 Further specification issues will be discussed in the next section.
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existence of a functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what
happens elsewhere.” In other words, observations are either independent of one another
or there is a spatial process underlying the correlation between observations. Standard
econometric methods, e.g., regression models for cross-sectional data, do not account for
spatial dependence in the covariates which can result in loss of efficiency and potential bias.
For researchers, spatial econometrics expands the toolbox of methods to include models that
explicitly account for interdependence among observations.
The “spatial autoregressive model” (SAR) is one approach to solve the problem of
spatial dependence. 33 The SAR model takes the structural form
Y∗ = ρWY∗ + Xβ + ε, (13)
where Y∗ is an N×1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is an N×K matrix
of explanatory variables, and β is a K × 1 vector of regression coefficients. The term ε is an
N × 1 vector that follows a multivariate normal distribution, i.e., ε ∼MVN (0, σ2IN). The
spatial weights matrix, W, is an N×N spatial weights matrix that captures the dependence
structure, and ρ is the dependence parameter such that ρ ∈ R. The “spatial lag” of the
dependent variable, WY∗, is the N × 1 vector that extends the standard regression model
to control for endogenous interaction in the outcome between observations.
The reduced form of the model is
Y∗ = (I− ρW)−1 (Xβ + ε) = (I− ρW)−1 Xβ + ξ, (14)
where ξ = (I−ρW)−1 ε. The disturbance ξ is both spatially correlated and heteroskedastic,
and, therefore, follows an N -dimensional multivariate normal distribution
ξ ∼MVN{(I− ρW)−1ε, [ (I− ρW)ᵀ(I− ρW) ]−1σ2εIN} . (15)
The term σ2ε is normalized to 1 to avoid the identification problem of separating β and σ
2
(See LeSage & Pace, 2009, chap. 10). Then the mean and variance of ξ is given by
E[ ξ ] = 0 (16)
and
V [ ξ] = Σ = [(I− ρW)ᵀ(I− ρW)]−1 , (17)
where Σ denotes the variance-covariance matrix.
The spatial weights W is the formal expression of spatial dependence (Anselin,
1988). There are several types of spatial weights matrices that can be used to summarize
the relations between spatial units. This study will utilize a k-nearest neighbor weights
matrix where for each i the distance, di,j, between all spatial units j 6= i 34 is sorted in
increasing order up to some positive integer m. For each spatial unit i, let Nm(i) denote
33 Another popular model is the “spatial error model” which controls for spatial dependence in the
unobservables.
34 A spatial unit i cannot be its own neighbor.
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the neighborhood set that contains the first m neighbors. 35 Then each element wi,j ∈W is
defined as:
wi,j =
{
1/k if di,j ∈ Nm(i),
0 else
, (18)
where each row is standardized so that the elements sum to unity (See Anselin, 1988).
Row standardization of the weights matrix W is common practice in applied research
for interpretive reasons and tractability. In this case, the matrix product WY∗ in equation
(13) is interpreted as a weighted average of the values observed at neighboring locations.
The critique of this specification is that WY∗ imposes equal weights on each neighboring
value rather than placing more weight on nearby observations (See McMillen, 2012). The
advantage of specifying a row standardized W is that the inverse of (I− ρW) is guaranteed
to exist for all ρ such that | ρ |< 1 (See LeSage & Pace, 2009, chap. 4). 36
The equation that links the unobserved latent variable Y∗ to the observed binary
outcome Y is
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0,
0 else
, (19)
for each spatial unit i. In the standard probit model, where Y∗ = Xβ + µ, the probability
that Y = 1 for the ith observation is
P{yi = 1 | X} = P{y∗i ≤ 0 | X}
= P{µi < xᵀiβ}
= Φ{xᵀiβ} ,
(20)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). For the SAR
probit, equation (20) for the ith observation is expressed as
P{yi = 1 | X} = P{y∗i ≤ 0 | X}
= P{ξi < (I− ρW)−1 xᵀiβ}
= Φ{(I− ρW)−1 xᵀiβ} .
(21)
The likelihood function, L, for (21) is an N-dimension integral
L = P
{
N⋂
i=1
Yi
}
=
∫
· · ·
∫
Y∗
φ(ξ) dξ , (22)
φ(ξ) = (2pi)
N
2 | Σ |−1 exp
{
−1
2
(εᵀ Σ−1 ε)
}
,
where φ is the normal density function and {Yi}Ni=1 = {yi ∈ Y | Yi = yi}. The disturbance
term ξ captures the spatial interdependence of ε, and, therefore, the marginal distribution
of ξ for each observation i is not independent. This requires that allN−1 other dimensions be
integrated out of the full multivariate normal distribution which is a substantial computational
challenge. The following section will briefly discuss some of the methodologies that have been
proposed to address the multidimensional integration problem.
35 Ties are ignored for simplicity.
36 This attribute also reduces the computational burden of finding the inverse of (I−ρW), especially when
dealing with a high dimensional spatial weights matrix.
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5.2 Estimation
Probit variants of the SAR model and their estimation methods have been considered
for over two decades. 37 McMillen (1992) was the first to address the integration problem in
(22) using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). He proposed an expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm to produce consistent estimates for the model. Albert and Chib (1993)
provided a Bayesian solution to estimate non-spatial probit models by treating the latent
variable y∗ as a parameter to estimate. This provided the foundation for LeSage (2000,
cited in LeSage & Pace, 2009) to develop the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
estimation procedure for the SAR probit model. This study will estimate the SAR probit
model under the Bayesian paradigm. The following section will specify the distributions of
the parameters of the model and discuss the estimation methods of the procedure.
Albert and Chib (1993) concluded that the joint conditional posterior distribution
for a set of parameters on both y∗ and y is equivalent to the posterior distribution involving
a continuous dependent variable. This is because if y∗ were known then the outcome, y,
would be known as well. Thus, p(β, ρ | y∗, y) = p(β, ρ | y∗). LeSage (2000, cited in LeSage
& Pace, 2009) builds on the MCMC sampling scheme developed by Albert and Chib (1993)
to estimate the SAR probit model
p(y∗, β, ρ | y) ∝ p(y | y∗, β, ρ) p(y∗ | β, ρ) p(β, ρ) , (23)
and,
p(y∗ | β, ρ) ∝ p(β, ρ | y∗) p(y∗). (24)
LeSage and Pace (2009) outline the procedure to sample from the posterior distribution.
The procedure is performed by sequentially sampling from the following three conditional
densities p(y∗ | β, ρ), p(β | y∗, ρ), and p(ρ | y∗, β) in an MCMC and Gibbs sampling scheme
(LeSage & Pace, 2009, p. 254). The presentation of the Bayesian procedure mirrors that
presented in LeSage and Pace (2009) and uses much of the same notation.
Dependence across observations is intrinsic to spatial models, and, therefore, the
conditional posterior distributions must allow for the case where the dependent variable
follows a spatial dependence process. In order to sample the latent y∗ parameters, the
procedure requires sampling from a multivariate truncated normal (TMVN) distribution,
y ∼ TMVN{µ,Σ} , (25)
where σ2 = 1 for identification, and µ = (I − ρW)−1Xβ (LeSage & Pace, p. 283). LeSage
and Pace (2009) adopt the approach developed by Geweke (1991, cited in LeSage & Pace,
2009, p. 285) to sample from p(y∗ | β, ρ) by drawing from the TMVN distribution expressed
in equation (25) using Gibbs sampling.
The procedure assumes independent prior distributions for β and ρ. The parameter
β is assigned a normal conjugate prior β ∼ N (c, T ) 38 , and a beta prior for the parameter
ρ ∼ B(α, α). The parameter β is sampled from the conditional density
p(β | y∗, ρ) ∝ N (c∗, T ∗) (26)
37 Readers are referred to Elhorst, Heunen, Samarina, and Jacobs (2017) for a review of estimation methods
for the spatial probit model.
38 LeSage and Pace (2009) found that the prior distribution for β is uninformative (diffuse) when c = 0
and T is set to a large magnitude, e.g., T = 109 · IN .
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S = (I− ρW)
T ∗ = (XᵀX + T−1)−1
c∗ = T ∗(XᵀSy∗ + T−1c).
Next, the parameter ρ is sampled from the conditional density
p(ρ | y∗, β) ∝| S | exp
{
−1
2
[S y∗ −Xβ]ᵀ[S y∗ −Xβ]
}
. (27)
The conditional density for the parameter ρ is non-standard, and requires an alternative
sampling scheme, often Metropolis-Hastings. LeSage and Pace (2009, chap. 5) present and
discuss the Metropolis-Hastings procedure for sampling the parameter ρ. 39
Non-linear models differ from linear regression models by the interpretation of the
marginal effects. The marginal effect of a point estimate βj is constant, whereas in non-linear
models the marginal effect is dependent on all the covariates. For a continuous regressor xj,
the instantaneous rate of change of xj on the response y conditional on x in the standard
probit model (20) is
∂P(yi = 1 | x)
∂xj
≡ ∂E(yi = 1 | x)
∂xj
= φ(xβ)βj , (28)
where the marginal effect of βj varies with values of x in the normal density function φ
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 467). A common approach is to use the average of the
regressors in x, denoted by x¯, then equation (28) is interpreted as a change in the probability
of the response for the typical or average observation. 40
The marginal effects for the SAR probit model must account for spatial dependence
because changes in the covariates of observation i can potentially impact the expectation of
the response in all N − 1 observations (LeSage et al., 2011; Elhorst el al., 2017). LeSage and
Pace (2009, p. 294) give an expression for the marginal effects for the jth regressor xj as
∂E(yi = 1 | xj)
∂xᵀj
= φ(S−1IN x¯jβj) S−1INβj , (29)
where x¯j is the mean of the jth explanatory variable, x
ᵀ
j is a 1×N vector representing the jth
regressor for all observations, S1 is the inverse of S as defined in (26), IN is an N×N identity
matrix, and the operator  represents the Hadamard product. 41 The evaluation in (29) is
interpreted as a MEM because the expression is conditional on all other covariates held fixed
at their respective means. The result of equation (29) is an N ×N matrix where the average
of the main diagonal elements represents the average direct impact of the marginal effect of
xj. Similarly, the average of the row or column is the average total impact. The difference
of the two produces the average indirect impact of the marginal effect of xj.
39 The full “Metropolis within Gibbs” sampling procedure is described in LeSage and Pace (2009, chap.
10).
40 This approach for computing the marginal effects of the point estimates β is known as Marginal Effects
at the Means (MEM). This approach can be problematic if the “average” is not representative of the sample.
41 The Hadamard (or Schur) product is a binary operator between two matrices, A and B, of the same
dimension, and returns the matrix C where each element ci,j = ai,j bi,j .
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5.3 Empirical Model
This section will introduce the empirical model that the study will estimate using the
procedure discussed above. Equation (10) is used to derive the latent spatial autoregressive
(SAR) index function for the propensity to invest:
R∗ = ρWR∗ + Xβ + NCω + HDθ + Undesignatedφ + SDτ + , (30)
where X is a vector of structural characteristics, such as age and size. The vector NC
describes neighborhood characteristics namely zoning. The term HD is a vector of historic
preservation variables designed to capture spillover effects of historic districts on undesignated
homes. Finally, Undesignated is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for buildings
that are just on the opposite side of a historic district boundary;the boundary of a historic
district, and SD is a vector socio-demographic attributes measured at the zip code level.
Finally, the spatial weights matrix W is specified as a row standardized matrix containing
the 6 nearest neighbors for each home in the sample. 42
In this analysis, spatial interactions are assumed to occur simultaneously. 43 The
spatial lag term WR∗ is correlated with , and is considered to be endogenous. The common
approach to remedy the endogeneity problem is to use the spatially lagged explanatory
variables WX 44 as instruments for WR∗. Recently, Gibbons and Overman (2012) have
criticized this technique by highlighting the several identification issues which arise from
relying solely on WX as an instrument. Without a suitable remedy, the estimate on ρ is
vulnerable to Manski’s (1993, cited in Helms, 2012) “reflection problem”, in which both
“endogenous” and “correlated” effects are captured by the parameter ρ. This study will not
address the identification issue.
Manski’s (1993, cited in Helms, 2012) “reflection problem” states that only the
overall effect of neighbors’ characteristics is identified. According to Gibbons and Overman
(2012), in the absence of “correlated” effects or spatial autocorrelation in the unobservables,
the mean neighborhood, or “endogenous”, effect is indistinguishable from the mean group
effect, or “contextual” on expected individual outcomes. Their work does not affect this
analysis because the model proposed in equation (30) does not contain any spatially lagged
explanatory variables. Therefore, the “contextual” effects, Undesignated and the terms of
HD, are identified (See Gibbons & Overman, 2012, p. 178).
In the renovation literature, authors often distinguish between maintenance and
improvement activities (Shear, 1983; Montgomery, 1992). Maintenance is an activity that
should keep the building in a sound operating condition. As opposed to improvements,
maintenance work should not substantially prolong the use of the property or significantly
alter the existing structure. In line with the renovation literature, this paper considers
improvements to be a separate activity from maintenance.
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical model accounts for depreciation. Thus, the
results of this study may be impacted by measurement error if the level of investment, R∗,
is not sufficient to offset depreciation. The impact of this error depends on local building
regulations and the type of alteration that requires a permit. The City of New York requires
42 See section 5.1 .
43 See section 4 .
44 The term X denotes the matrix of explanatory variables as defined in equations (13) and (14) .
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all building owners to file for a permit 45 from the Department of Buildings prior to starting
any “major” alteration activity. 46 According to the City of New York, no permit is required
for “minor alterations” and “ordinary repairs”. 47 Nonetheless, this study acknowledges the
potential for upward bias in the coefficients due to this error.
6 Data
Figure 1 shows annual totals of designated districts and affected boroughs since
1965. Historic preservation had a real impact in New York City in 2009. During that year,
designation occurred in 4 out 5 boroughs for a total of 8 designated historic districts. Hence,
this study uses public micro-level data single-family homes that were privately owned in
2009.
As previously mentioned, all property owners are required to obtain a permit from
the Department of Buildings (DOB) before beginning any major alteration project. First,
the applicant submits plans and drawings along with the application to the DOB for review.
Then, the DOB reviews the submission to determine the job type and cost of the proposed
project. 48 If the plan is approved, then the final step for the applicant is to file for a permit.
The DOB offers three types of alteration permits. These are Alteration-Type 1, 2,
and 3. An Alteration-Type 3 (ALT3) permit is required for projects that involve only one
work type. 49 Alteration projects that involve several work types require an Alteration-Type
2 (ALT2) permit. Neither ALT3 nor ALT2 affects the use, egress, or occupancy of the
building. Such cases would require an Alteration-Type 1 (ALT1) permit. ALT1 permits
typically cover conversions such as converting a 3-family home into a 1-family home, or
commercial building into a residential building. 50
The data for this analysis come from several administrative sources. The variables
were created using three separate datasets. I use the Historical DOB Permit Issuance dataset
to construct the dependent variable. 51 For the explanatory variables, I rely on the Primary
Land Use Tax Lot Output (PLUTO) dataset maintained by the Department of City Planning
(DCP). 52 The fields that I used from PLUTO and the Historical DOB permit issuance
45 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §28-101.5 and §28-105.4.
46 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §27-332 and §28-101.5.
47 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §28-105.4.2 and §28-105.4.2.1. For single-family homes, see https://www1.nyc.
gov/assets/buildings/rules/1_RCNY_101-14.pdf for examples of jobs types that require permits.
48 NYC Buildings, Permits, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/homeowner/permits.page (last
visited May 5, 2017). The typical applicants is a licensed professional (Professional Engineer or Registered
Architect).
49 For example, plumbing, electrical, boiler, etc.
50 Provided that local zoning laws allow for such conversions in the first place.
51 This dataset is publicly available at NYC OpenData, and can be accessed here: https://data.
cityofnewyork.us/Housing-Development/Historical-DOB-Permit-Issuance/bty7-2jhb (last visited
May 5, 2017).
52 This dataset can be accessed directly via the following links: https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/planning/download/zip/data-maps/open-data/nyc_pluto_07c.zip, https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/planning/download/zip/data-maps/open-data/nyc_pluto_09v1.zip and https://www1.nyc.
gov/assets/planning/download/zip/data-maps/open-data/nyc_pluto_09v2.zip (last visited May 5,
2017).
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datasets are presented in table 1 . Lastly, the 2000 Decennial Census was used to create
socio-demographic measurements at the zip code level.
The Historical DOB Permit Issuance dataset contains information for 1,110,544
permits that were issued between 1989 and 2013. Permits that were renewals or issued for
anything other than an alteration, such as new construction or demolition, were dropped from
the dataset. Also, I discarded permits that were missing the filing date. While this dataset
contains some structural attributes, it lacks information on important building characteristics
such as age, area, and designation status. For that information, I rely on the PLUTO dataset.
The PLUTO dataset is a collection of administrative data that describes geographic,
political, and structural attributes for hundreds of thousands of parcels or tax lots. Other
city agencies in addition to the DCP, such as the Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC)
and Department of Finance (DOF), contribute to the collection. At the time of this study,
there are twenty-one datasets covering the years between 2002 and 2016. This study uses the
2009 release to construct several of the explanatory variables. 53 Table 2 contains definitions
for the variables that were used in the analysis.
The initial goal in processing the PLUTO data was to create a sample of privately
owned single-family homes. This was accomplished using two fields: Building Class and Type
of Ownership. 54 Every building is assigned a building class code by the DOF to describe
the building’s use. 55 The type of ownership includes private, public, and mixed. Any parcel
that did not satisfy the criteria was dropped from the final dataset.
Next, I construct the following explanatory variables: Age, BldgAreaK, LotAreaK,
Detached, Semi-Attached, Attached, Irregular, and Easements. 56 BldgAreaK and LotAreaK
measure the size of the parcel and lot, respectively. Both variables were rescaled to units of
1000 square feet. The dichotomous variables Detached, Semi-Attached, Attached describe
the physical relationship of buildings to their neighbors. Additional dichotomous measures
are Irregular and Easements, which describe whether the parcel is located on an irregular
lot and has an easement, respectively. Finally, Age is calculated as the difference between
2009 and the year the building was constructed.
It is important to note that the YearBuilt field has been found to be highly inaccurate
(Lewis, 2014). A study by Lewis (2014, p. 43) found that some entries are off by as much as
73 years. Because Lewis (2014) used all building types, the extent to which this inaccuracy
affects single-family homes is not clear. Hence, I use the field to create the variable Age.
Nevertheless, this study acknowledges the bias that may result from the measurement error.
In line with previous research (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001), a variable was designed
to capture a building’s propinquity to a historic district for each observation in the sample.
The first measure Undesig is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if a parcel is not
historically designated. 57 The second variable NumHist is designed to capture a building’s
nearness to a historic district as described in equation (5). 58 NumHist is an aggregate of
53 Building characteristics for 2,218 homes were obtained from the late 2008 release (version 7c).
54 These fields are BldgClass and OwnershipType, respectively.
55 The DOF assigns the code ’A’ to single-family homes.
56 I use the following fields YearBuilt, LotArea, BldgArea, ProxCode, IrrLotCode, and Easements,
respectively.
57 I use the field HistDist to build the variable.
58 Coulson and Leichenko (2001) construct a similar measure, except at the census tract level.
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neighboring designated properties. However, it can be argued that for dynamic urban real
estate markets, such as New York City, the specification in equation (5) fails to account
for the heterogeneity of historic districts as well as neighborhood density (See Coulson &
Leichenko, 2001). For example, a household can be near several districts where each district
differs in the number of designated properties it contains. This study does not specify a
measure to account for heterogeneity of historic districts as it relates to density.
The hypothesis that historic designation has a positive impact on neighborhood
quality is shown in equation (11b). Undesig and NumHist are key measures in equation
(30). But, historic districts in New York City are heterogeneous in both size and age. The
age of a home, as a structural characteristic, has an impact on renovation decisions. Similarly,
the age of the amenity is a neighborhood characteristic and should affect renovation decisions
indirectly. 59 For undesignated properties outside of historic districts, the variable TimePost
measures the number of years post-designation. The GIS methods that I employ to construct
NumHist and TimePost are subsequently discussed.
The geographic location of the sample units is necessary in order to construct
NumHist and TimePost. I rely on two fields to accomplish this: the X and Y coordinates.
The coordinates are expressed in the New York-Long Island State Plane coordinate system. 60
These fields combined describe the approximate location of parcels. Parcels that are missing
either coordinate were discarded. The 2009 release of PLUTO provides the name of the
historic district for each designated parcel. However, the dataset does not provide the date
of designation. For that information, I use data obtained from the LPC 61 to match historic
district names with their date of designation. Next, I split the PLUTO data according to
Undesig to calculate the number of designated buildings within 750ft 62 in two steps. First,
the data was split into two groups: undesignated single-homes and designated properties.
Then, for each undesignated home, I calculate the Euclidean distance between each property
in the designated group counting only those properties that had a distance of at most 750ft.
For each undesignated property, I sort the set of neighboring designated buildings according
to distance and select the first two nearest neighbors. Then, these two properties were joined
with their corresponding district and date of designation information. Finally, the earliest
date of designation between the two nearest neighbors was chosen to calculate TimePost.
Afterward, I repeat this process for designated single-family homes and all other designated
buildings. Lastly, I interact each continuous measure with the binary variable Undesig
to create NumHistxUndesig and TimePostxUndesig. The first interaction will capture
the impact of propinquity for undesignated homes with increases in NumHist. Similarly,
TimePostxUndesig captures the impact of designation status on renovation decisions for
undesignated homes.
Parcels in New York City are assigned two identification codes. The first is a 10
character code known as the “Borough-Block-Lot” (BBL), which is a concatenation of the
borough, tax block, and tax lot. The second identification number called the “Building
59 I assume designation is exogenously determined. See section 4 .
60 PLUTO Data Dictionary. (9v2) New York City Department of City Planning 2009. Page 37.
61Historic district names and date of designation was retrieved from http://www1.nyc.gov/site/lpc/
designations/designation-reports.page (last visited June 10, 2017).
62 The distance was chosen arbitrarily. 750ft is approximately the length of three city blocks or one avenue.
See Been et al. (2016).
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Identification Number” (BIDN). Normally, there is no one-to-one correspondence between
the two because many buildings can be constructed on a single lot. 63 This is not an issue
on the presumption that each lot contains only one building since the sample is restricted
to single-family homes. The dependent variable Alter is a dichotomous variable that takes
the value 1, if there was a record of a permit issued in 2009. To create Alter, I merged
the Historical DOB permit issuance dataset together with the Pluto dataset. Later, missing
entries were replaced with 0. Unfortunately, there was no information to denote the length
of ownership or mode of tenure. I included one characteristic of ownership that describes
the last recorded occurrence of an alteration. The variable YearsLastAlt subtracts the latest
year between fields YearAlter1 or YearAlter2 from 2009.
Two measures of zoning regulations were included in the final analysis. The first
is BuiltMaxFAR, which is calculated as the built residential Floor-to-Area ratio (FAR)
divided by the maximum allowable residential FAR. The second is an indicator for a special
purpose or limited height zoning regulation given by SpecialZoning. Finally, I use subsets
of the 2000 Decennial Census to create the remaining explanatory variables measuring
socio-demographic measures at the zip code level. The variables Black, Asian, OtherMin are
percentage measures of the racial and ethnic composition of the zip code for each home in the
sample. For each zip code, the variable MeanEarningsK is the average of earning reported
by households rescaled to units of a thousand dollars. The last two variables ForeignMaj
and CollegeMaj are dichotomous. ForeignMaj takes the value 1 if most households in a zip
code reported another country as their place of birth, and CollegeMaj measures whether or
not the majority of households in a zip code report holding at least a college degree. These
columns were joined by zip code to create the final sample.
The final sample contains 315,627 observations. Only 3,064 homes, or approximately
one percent of the sample, performed an alteration in 2009. As expected, most of the
alterations were performed by undesignated homes. Only 141 designated homes performed
an alteration in 2009. Basic summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis are
given for all observations in table 3. Summary statistics for undesignated and designated
homes are given in tables 4 and 5 , respectively.
7 Results
This paper includes a non-interactive probit model as a benchmark for comparison
with the SAR probit model. The Bayesian MCMC sampling procedure 64 , as described
in section 5.2 , was used to estimate the parameters in equation (30) . The spatial probit
model was estimated using a random sample of 124,248 observations from the full sample of
315,627. The entire sample was used to estimate the standard non-spatial probit.
The results for the standard probit is reported in table 6 along with cluster-adjusted
standard errors and marginal effects calculated at means. The pseudo-R2 statistic is low,
but low predictive power is common in previous studies on renovation. Table 7 shows the
63 Depends on local zoning regulations.
64 The estimation procedure has been performed using the spatialprobit library in R. The
logLik.sarprobit function was modified in order to accommodate high dimensional spatial weights
matrices.
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estimates of the SAR probit model. The “direct”, “indirect”, and “total” marginal effects
for the spatial probit are presented in tables 8 , 9 , and 10 , respectively.
The coefficients in the spatial lag model in table 7 show the variables’ influence on
renovation decisions independent of spatial neighborhood effects. The size and direction for
most of the coefficients are strikingly similar between the two models. However, some of
the estimates, especially those of interest to study, lost some or all significance for the SAR
probit model. The estimates that lost significance in the spatial model also had insignificant
marginal effects. The loss in the significance is not surprising and it is in accordance with
the previous empirical work on spatial neighborhood effects.
Table 7 suggests that the interdependence among neighbors should not be ignored.
In particular, the result for ρ is positive and statistically significant. However, the effect of
the spatial dependence parameter ρ can include spatial autocorrelation in the unobservables.
In the absence of such autocorrelation, the coefficient is interpreted as the strength of the
“first order” spatial feedbacks. The result finds that spatial neighborhood effects have a
positive influence on renovation decisions, but whether or not the effects work only through
endogenous neighborhood effects cannot be determined.
The estimate for Age does not vary between both models. The results in both
estimations consistently show Age to be a significant predictor of renovation. While significant,
the “total” marginal effects of Age in table 10 is much less than in the standard probit, and
effectively zero. This finding could be the result of measurement error which may have
produced a downward bias given the direction of the coefficient. Despite the potential for
downward bias due to measurement error 65 the estimates and marginal effects for Age are
very close in magnitude to the findings of other empirical studies.
In the non-spatial model, the coefficients for BldgAreaK and LotAreaK were positive
and significant at the 1% level. Unlike LotAreaK, the significance of BldgAreaK is reduced
once the standard errors are clustered by zip code. The findings suggest that both variables
have a positive impact on the propensity to renovate. The marginal effect for both variables
was statistically significant, but the impact on the probability to renovate was different. The
marginal effect for LotAreaK is effectively zero, whereas the marginal effect for BldgAreaK
is positive. All else equal, a change in the area of the home increases the probability of
renovating by 0.015%. In the SAR probit model, the estimates of both variables were
statistically significant but the magnitude slightly increased for LotAreaK and decreased
for BldgAreaK. There is no change in the marginal effects of LotAreaK, and the variable
continues to have no practical effect suggesting that lot size has a trivial impact on the
probability of performing a renovation. However, the “direct” effect of a change in BldgAreaK
increases the probability of performing a renovation by 0.014%. Like LotAreaK, the “indirect”
effect of a change in BldgAreaK is effectively zero suggesting that a change average building
size of neighboring properties have little to no effect on the probability that a homeowner
will renovate. The combined effects or “total” effect for BldgAreaK shows that a change in
building size increases the probability to renovate by 0.0176%.
With regard to the dichotomous measures describing the physical relationship of
buildings, the direction and significance of these variables were consistent in every estimation.
Both Attached and SemiAttached had a significantly lower impact on the probability to
65 See section 6 .
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renovate when compared to the baseline of Detached homes. The marginal effects for
Attached and SemiAttached in the non-spatial probit were slightly larger than in the spatial
counterpart, i.e., “total” marginal effects.
Likewise, the findings for the dummy variable indicating whether the home was built
on an irregular shaped lot was consistent in both estimations. The direction of the coefficient
on Irregular shows that homes built on irregular shaped lots are more likely to renovate then
those built are standard lots. The marginal effects of Irregular is slightly stronger in the
spatial model. This finding demonstrates how taking into account spatial dependencies can
help better explain regional phenomena. The direct marginal effect of Irregular increases the
probability of renovating by 0.016%, which is slightly larger than the marginal effect in the
standard probit model. The indirect effect of Irregular is interpreted as a positive spillover
effect on the probability to renovate. Although the impact is not strong, the indirect effect
of Irregular increases the probability of renovating by 0.00423%, whereas, the effect is zero in
the non-spatial probit because spatial interdependencies are ignored. The combined effects,
total, of Irregular increases the probability of renovating by 0.02%.
In contrast, the significance on the coefficients for Easements and YrsLastAlt changed
across estimates. The direction and magnitude was the same for YrsLastAlt, but was only
significant at the 10% level in the SAR probit model. Once a control for spatial neighborhood
effects was introduced, the coefficient on Easements lost all significance. The marginal
effects for the standard probit show that the effect of Easements negatively impacts the
probability of renovating by 0.074%, while the effect for YrsLastAlt had a positive impact
on the probability to renovate of 0.002%. The marginal effect for both Easements and
YrsLastAlt was insignificant in the spatial model.
The coefficients on SpecialZoning and BuiltMaxFAR were positive and negative,
respectively. However, the result for SpecialZoning was insignificant in every estimation. The
interpretation of the coefficient of BuiltMaxFAR is that increases in the built FAR of a home
relative to the maximum allowable FAR decreases the probability of performing an alteration
on the home. The marginal effect of BuiltMaxFAR is similar for both models, but somewhat
weaker in the non-spatial model. This difference in marginal effects is another example why
the underlying spatial process in renovation decisions should not be omitted.The “direct”
effect of BuiltMaxFAR is −0.0048, while “indirect” effect of BuiltMaxFAR is at −0.00131.
The interpretation of the direct effect is that a change in the built FAR relative to the
maximum allowable FAR decreases the probability of renovation by 0.048%. The indirect
effect is interpreted as a change in the average of the built FAR relative to the maximum
allowable FAR for homeowner’s first six neighborhoods decreases the probability to renovate
by 0.0131%. The total effect of BuiltMaxFAR decreases the probability of renovating for the
average single-home by −0.061%.
The results for the explanatory variables controlling for various aspects of historic
preservation were surprising. Except for TimePostxUndesig, the magnitude, and direction for
Undesig, NumHist, NumHistxUndesig, and TimePost were similar in both models. Although
the direction of Undesig indicates that undesignated homes have a higher propensity to
renovate, the lack of significance suggests that designation status has no real influence on
renovation decisions for single-family homeowners. The coefficient and marginal effect of
NumHist was significant at the 10% level in the standard probit estimate. Ceteris paribus, a
change in nearness to a historic district, as measured by the number of neighboring historic
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district properties, has no real impact on the probability to renovate. In the SAR model,
the direction on NumHist does not change; however, the estimate and the marginal effect
is no longer significant. The insignificance on the interaction term NumHistxUndesig does
not support the hypothesis that nearness to a historic district has any effect on renovation
decisions of single-family homeowners in undesignated neighborhoods. The direction of the
coefficient on NumHistxUndesig suggests that nearness to a historic district decreases the
propensity to renovate for owners of undesignated single-family homes. The findings above
does not mean that these homeowners take no action as a result of the propinquity to a
historic district. The impact of historic preservation on nearby areas could incentivize these
homeowners to take other courses of action such as selling their property.
The variables TimePost and TimePostxUndesig are, in effect, temporal measures of
historic preservation as measured by the age of the amenity. The result for TimePost was
consistently significant at the 5% level in the non-spatial model, although the significance
changed to 10% in the SAR model. The result for TimePost suggests that the number
of years post-designation has a positive impact on renovation decisions. As the age of the
amenity increases by one year, the probability of renovation increases by 0.0016%, all else
equal. However, the marginal effect of TimePost was no longer significant in the spatial
model. While the designation of historic districts appears to have a temporal effect, the
findings for TimePostxUndesig does not support the hypothesis that historic preservation has
such an effect on the renovation activity of undesignated single family-homes. These findings
suggest that much of the increases in renovation activity could be occurring within designated
districts. Then, the results would be consistent with the conclusion that enforcement of the
local preservation laws solves the investor’s dilemma. 66
The remaining variables measure socio-demographics were mixed as well. The
strongest result in both models was the effect of CollegeMaj. The “total” marginal effect of
CollegeMaj was 0.144% in the standard probit, and 0.0809% in the SAR model. Additionally,
CollegeMaj had large and significant “direct” and “indirect” marginal effects of 0.065% and
0.0159%, respectively. The effect of the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods
largely conforms to previous findings with respect to the impact of Black and OtherMin.
The impact on renovation decisions of residing in a zip code that is mostly inhabited
by homeowners of Asian descent is strongly positive and statistically significant in both
estimations. The analysis did not find a significant effect for ForeignMaj.
The results of both models do not support the hypothesis that historic preservation
has any real or meaningful impact on renovation decisions for single-family homeowners.
At the same time, the results do not support the claim that historic preservation negatively
impacts renovation decisions either. As suggested by earlier research, many of the explanatory
variables, such as the controls for historic districts, are proxies for endogenous spatial
neighborhood effects and are not themselves determinants of renovation decisions. However,
the results of this study can only apply to owners of single-family homes. The question
whether historic preservation generates or impedes renovation activity in general remains
open.
66 See section 4 .
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8 Conclusion
The preservation movement arose out of the need to protect resources of historical
distinction before they were truly lost to history. Historic districting has manifested as an
efficacious means to advance preservation. Its prevalence in many cities, nationally and
internationally, evinces the widening consensus among policy makers, community leaders,
and proponents on the necessity and mode of preserving historic assets. Yet, the mainstream
approach through regulation has considerable implications on property rights.
This study was concerned with the external effects of historic preservation on adjacent
neighborhoods as it relates to renovation decisions. The restrictions on property rights serve
as a point of contention in the debate over historic preservation in general, and historic
districts in particular. Despite these concerns, this study found no evidence to support the
claim that historic preservation inhibits renovation activity among single-family homeowners.
At the same time, the results of this study challenge the effectiveness of historic preservation
as a policy instrument to spur investment in New York City residential housing markets.
This analysis provides some insight into the impact of historic preservation on
renovation activity by single-family homeowners. However, this study is limited in scope and
has considerable shortcomings leaving the door open for more empirical work on the subject.
Future research can expand on the theory presented in this paper to include maintenance, a
range of property types, and temporal effects in an inter-temporal framework. The findings of
this paper hope to spur more research into historic preservation and its role in the adjustment
mechanism of the housing supply.
29
9 References
[1] Ahlfeldt, G. M., & Maennig, W. (2010). Substitutability and complementarity of urban
amenities: External effects of built heritage in Berlin. Real Estate Economics, 38(2),
285-323.
[2] Albert, J. H., & Chib, S. (1993). Bayesian analysis of binary and polychotomous
response data. Journal of the American statistical Association, 88(422), 669-679.
[3] Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[4] Asabere, P. K., & Huffman, F. E. (1991). Historic Districts and Land Values. The
Journal of Real Estate Research, 6, 1-7.
[5] Asabere, P. K., & Huffman, F. E. (1994a). The Value Discounts Associated with Historic
Facade Easements. The Appraisal Journal, 62(2), 270-277.
[6] Asabere, P. K., & Huffman, F. E. (1994b). Historic Designation and Residential Market
Values. The Appraisal Journal, 62(3), 396-401.
[7] Asabere, P. K., Hachey, G., & Grubaugh, S. (1989) Architecture, Historic Zoning, and
the Value of Homes. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2, 181-195.
[8] Asabere, P. K., Huffman, F. E., & Mehdian, S. (1994). The Adverse Impacts of Local
Historic Designation: The Case of Small Apartment Buildings in Philadelphia. Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 8, 225-234.
[9] Been, V., Ellen, I. G., Gedal, M., Glaeser, E., & McCabe, B. J. (2016). Preserving
history or restricting development? The heterogeneous effects of historic districts on
local housing markets in New York City. Journal of Urban Economics, 92, 16-30.
[10] Bell, J. S. (2013). The politics of preservation: privileging one heritage over another.
International Journal of Cultural Property, 20(4), 431-450.
[11] Boehm, T. P., & Ihlanfeldt, K. R. (1986). The improvement expenditures of urban
homeowners: An empirical analysis. Real Estate Economics, 14(1), 48-60.
[12] Boge, G., & Boge, M. (1993). Early Preservation Efforts In Paving Over the
Past: A History And Guide To Civil War Battlefield Preservation(2). Retrieved
from https://books.google.com/books?id=Q92C7xwkxHgC&printsec=frontcover&
source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false.
[13] Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of
Empirical Studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175-188.
[14] Byrne, J. P. (2012). Historic preservation and its cultured despisers: Reflections on the
contemporary role of preservation law in urban development. George Mason Law Review
19(3), 665-688.
30
[15] Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: methods and applications.
Cambridge University Press.
[16] Clark, D. E., & Herrin, W. E. (1997). Historical preservation districts and home sale
prices: Evidence from the Sacramento housing market. Review of Regional Studies,
27(1), 29-48.
[17] Coulson, N. E., & Lahr, M. L. (2005). Gracing the Land of Elvis and Beale Street:
Historic Designation and Property Values in Memphis. Real Estate Economics, 33(3),
487-507.
[18] Coulson, N. E., & Leichenko, R. M. (2001). The Internal and External Impact
of Historical Designation on Property Values. Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 23(1), 113-124.
[19] Coulson, N. E., & Leichenko, R. M. (2004). Historic Preservation and Neighbourhood
Change. Urban Studies, 41(8), 1587-1600.
[20] Culp, R. (2011). Relocate then renovate: An empirical analysis of the role of
environmental attributes in the home improvement decision. Journal of Housing
Research, 20(1), 53-66.
[21] DiPasquale, D. (1999). Why Don’t We Know More about Housing Supply?. Journal of
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 18(1), 9-23.
[22] Elhorst, J. P., Heijnen, P., Samarina, A., & Jacobs, J. P. (2017). Transitions at different
moments in time: A spatial probit approach. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 32(2),
422-439.
[23] Fallis, G. (1985). Housing Economics. Toronto, Canada: Butterworths-Heinemann.
[24] Ford, D. A. (1989). The effect of historic district designation on single-family home
prices. Real Estate Economics, 17(3), 353-362.
[25] Gibbons, S. & Overman, H. G. (2012). Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics? Journal
of Regional Science, 52(2), 172-191.
[26] Glaeser, E. (2010). Preservation Follies. City Journal, 20(2).
[27] Heintzelmann, M. D., & Altieri, J. A. (2013). Historic Preservation: Preserving Value?.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 46(3), 543-563.
[28] Helms, A. C. (2003). Understanding Gentrification: An Empirical Analysis of the
Determinants of Urban Housing Renovation. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(3),
479-498.
[29] Helms, A. C. (2012). Keeping Up with the Joneses: Neighborhood Effects in Housing
Renovation. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42, 303-313.
31
[30] Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. (2017). Demographic Change
and the Remodeling Outlook. Retrieved from Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University: http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_
2017_remodeling_report_0.pdf.
[31] Laska, S. B., Seaman, J. M., & McSeveney, D. R. (1982). Inner-City Reinvestment:
Neighborhood Characteristics and Spatial Patterns Over Time. Urban Studies, 19,
155-165.
[32] Leichenko, R. M., Coulson, N. E., & Listokin, D. (2001). Historic Preservation and
Residential Property Values: An Analysis of Texas Cities. Urban Studies, 38(11),
1973-1987.
[33] LeSage, J., & Pace, R. K. (2009). Introduction to Spatial Econometrics. Chapman and
Hall/CRC.
[34] LeSage, J. P., Kelley Pace, R., Lam, N., Campanella, R., & Liu, X. (2011). New Orleans
business recovery in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 174(4), 1007-1027.
[35] Lewis, J. B. (2014). Measuring the Impact of Historic District Designation on Real
Estate in New York City. (Master’s Thesis). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.
7916/D8K072S3.
[36] Lindsay, P. (2012). Can we own the past? Cultural artifacts as public goods. Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 15(1), 1-17.
[37] Listokin, D., Listokin, B., & Lahr, M. (1998). The Contributions of Historic Preservation
to Housing and Economic Development. Housing Policy Debate, 9(3), 431-478.
[38] Lockard, W. E., & Hinds, D. S. (1983). Historic Zoning Considerations in Neighborhood
and District Analysis. The Appraisal Journal, 51(4), 485-497.
[39] Loflin, J. J., Rankin. J. L., Marcus, N., & Goldstone, H. H. (1971). Historic Preservation
in the American City: A New York Case Study. Law and Contemporary Problems, 36(3),
362-385.
[40] Matthes, E. H. (2016). The Ethics of Historic Preservation. Philosophy Compass, 11(12),
786-794.
[41] Mayer, N. S. (1981). Rehabilitation Decisions in Rental Housing: An Empirical Analysis.
Journal of Urban Economics, 10(1), 76-94.
[42] McCabe, B. J., & Ellen, I. G. (2016). Does Preservation Accelerate Neighborhood
Change? Examining the Impact of Historic Preservation in New York City. Journal
of the American Planning Association, 82(2), 134-146.
[43] McMillen, D. P. (1992). Probit with spatial autocorrelation. Journal of Regional Science,
32(3), 335-348.
32
[44] McMillen, D. P. (2012). Perspectives on spatial econometrics: Linear smoothing with
structured models. Journal of Regional Science, 52(2), 192-209.
[45] Mendelsohn, R. (1977). Empirical Evidence on Home Improvements. Journal of Urban
Economics, 4, 459-468.
[46] Montgomery, C. (1992). Explaining Home Improvement in the Context of Household
Investment in Residential Housing. Journal of Urban Economics, 32, 326-350.
[47] Munneke, H. J., & Womack, K. S. (2015). Neighborhood Renewal: The Decision to
Renovate or Tear Down. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 54, 99-115.
[48] Newsom, M. D. (1971). Blacks and Historic Preservation. Law & Contemporary
Problems, 36(3), 423-431.
[49] Noonan, D. S. (2007). Finding an Impact of Preservation Policies: Price Effects of
Historic Landmarks on Attached Homes in Chicago, 1990-1999. Economic Development
Quarterly, 21(1), 17-33.
[50] Noonan, D. S., & Krupka, D. J. (2011). Making-or picking-winners: Evidence of internal
and external price effects in historic preservation policies. Real Estate Economics, 39(2),
379-407.
[51] Rickman, D. S. (2009). Neighborhood historic preservation status and housing values in
Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, 39(2), 99-108.
[52] Robinson, N. A. (1981). Historic preservation law: The metes (and) bounds of new field.
Pace Law Review, 1(3), 511-566.
[53] Rose, C. M. (1981). Preservation and community: New directions in the law of historic
preservation. Stanford Law Review, 473-534.
[54] Rypkema, D. D. (2000). The So-Called Property Rights Movement. Bulletin of Science,
Technology & Society, 20(4), 321-325.
[55] Schaeffer, P. V., & Millerick, C. A. (1991). The impact of historic district designation on
property values: An empirical study. Economic Development Quarterly, 5(4), 301-312.
[56] Schneider, T. (2001). From Monuments to Urban Renewal: How Different Philosophies
of Historic Preservation Impact the Poor. Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy,
8, 257-281.
[57] Shear, W. B. (1983). Urban housing rehabilitation and move decisions. Southern
Economic Journal, 1030-1052.
[58] Sweeney, J. L. (1974a). Quality, commodity hierarchies, and housing markets.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 147-167.
[59] Sweeney, J. L. (1974b). Housing unit maintenance and the mode of tenure. Journal of
Economic Theory, 8(2), 111-138.
33
[60] Sweeney, J. L. (1974c). A commodity hierarchy model of the rental housing market.
Journal of Urban Economics, 1(3), 288-323.
[61] Uzdavinis, B. (2007). To Save or Note to Save: Historic Preservation in New
Jersey-Justifications, Hindrances, Future. Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy, 4(4),
649.
[62] Warren, K. J. (1999). A philosophical perspective on the ethics and resolution of cultural
property issues. In P. M. Messenger (Ed.), The Ethics of Collecting Cultural Property,
p. 1-26. USA: University of New Mexico Press.
[63] Wetzstein, S. (2017). The global urban housing affordability crisis. Urban Studies,
54(14), 3159-3177.
[64] Wojno, C. T. (1991). Historic preservation and economic development. Journal of
Planning Literature, 5(3), 296-306.
[65] Wood, A. (2008). Preserving New York: Winning the right to protect a city’s landmarks.
New York City: Routledge.
[66] Zahirovic-Herbert, V., & Chatterjee, S. (2012). Historic preservation and residential
property values: Evidence from quantile regression. Urban Studies, 49(2), 369-382.
[67] Zahirovic-Herbert, V., & Gibler, K. M. (2014). The effect of new residential construction
on housing prices. Journal of Housing Economics, 26(C), 1-18.
34
10 Tables
Table 1: Description of Data Fields
Source Field Description
Pluto
BBL A concatenation of the borough code, tax block, and tax lot.
ZipCode The zip code where the building is located.
BldgClass A code describing the major use of buildings on the tax lot.
SPDist The special purpose or limited height district assigned to the tax lot.
Easements Number of easements on the tax lot.
OwnerType A code describing the type of ownership for the tax lot.
LotArea
The total area of the tax lot rounded to the nearest integer, expressed
in units of square feet.
BldgArea The total gross area of the building, expressed in units of square feet.
ProxCode The physical relationship of the building to neighboring buildings.
IrrLotCode A code indicating whether the tax lot is irregularly shaped.
YearBuilt The year when the construction of the buildings was completed.
YearAlter The year of the building’s most recent alteration.
XCoord The X coordinate of the XY coordinatea pair.
YCoord The Y coordinate of the XY coordinatea pair.
HistDist
The name of the historic district as designated by the Landmarks
Preservation Commission.
DateofDesignation b
The date of the historic district as designated by the Landmarks
Preservation Commission.
BuiltFAR
The built Floor Area Ratio is the total building floor area
divided by the area of the tax lot.
MaxAllwFAR The maximum allowable residential Floor Area Ratio.
Historical DOB Permit Issuance
Bin Num. Building identification number.
Borough The borough where the building is located.
Block The number of the tax block where the building is located.
Lot The number of the tax lot where the building is located.
Job Doc. Num.
The number assigned to jobs that were approved by
the Department of Buildings.
Job Type A code describing the permit that was approved.
Work Type A code describing the type of work that the job entails.
Filing Date The date of when the permit was filed.
Filing Status A code indicating whether the permit is a renewal.
a The coordinates are expressed in the New York-Long Island State Plane coordinate system.
b DateofDesignation is not included in the PLUTO dataset. This field was constructed using HistDist and an data retrieved from the LPC.
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Table 2: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Alter A dummy variable indicating whether the building performed an alteration.
Age The age of the structure as of 2009.
BldgAreaK The total gross area of the home, expressed in 1000 square feet.
LotAreaK The total area of the lot, expressed in 1000 square feet.
Attached A dummy variable indicating whether the building is attached to neighboring buildings.
SemiAttached A dummy variable indicating whether the building is partially attached to neighboring buildings.
Irregular A dummy variable indicting whether the shape of the tax lot is irregular.
Easements A dummy variable indicting whether a building has an easement.
YrsLastAlt The number of years since the building’s last alteration as of 2009.
BuiltMaxFAR The ratio between the BuiltFAR over the MaxAllwFAR. a
SpecialZoning A dummy variable indicting whether a special zoning rule is assigned to the building.
Undesig A dummy variable indicating whether a building is not located within a historic district.
NumHist The number of historically designated properties within a radius of 750 feet.
NumHistxUndesig An interaction term between NumHist and Undesig.
TimePost The number of years that have passed since the nearest historic districts was designated.
TimePostxUndesig An interaction term between TimePost and Undesig.
Black A percentage of residents in a zip code that identify as black or having African ancestry.
Asian A percentage of residents in a zip code that identify as having Asian ancestry.
OtherMin A percentage of non-white residents in a zip code that identify as having an ancestry other than African or Asian.
MeanEarningsK The mean of reported earnings of residents by zip code, expressed in unit of $1000 dollars.
ForeignMaj A dummy variable indicating whether the majority of residents in a zip code reported another country as their birth place.
CollegeMaj A dummy variable indicating whether the majority of residents in a zip code reported having a college degree.
a See table 1 .
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Table 3: Statistical Summary for Single-Family Homes
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 65.858 24.926 0 280
BldgAreaK 1.678 0.840 0.000 72.520
LotAreaK 3.490 23.530 0.000 12,253.430
Attached 0.186 0.389 0 1
SemiAttached 0.218 0.413 0 1
Irregular 0.109 0.312 0 1
Easements 0.004 0.061 0 1
YrsLastAlt 0.286 1.810 0 109
BuiltMaxFAR 0.838 0.484 0.000 22.800
SpecialZoning 0.135 0.341 0 1
Undesig 0.986 0.117 0 1
NumHist 1.891 18.814 0 428
NumHistxUndesig 0.405 6.190 0 365
TimePost 0.485 3.751 0 44
TimePostxUndesig 0.187 2.275 0 43
Black 25.487 31.285 0.100 93.500
Asian 10.356 10.287 0.300 53.900
OtherMin 11.072 9.438 0.400 57.600
MeanEarningsK 61.833 10.747 28.661 166.873
ForeignMaj 0.091 0.288 0 1
CollegeMaj 0.008 0.088 0 1
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Table 4: Statistical Summary for Undesignated Single-Family Homes
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 65.459 24.768 0 280
BldgAreaK 1.657 0.802 0.000 72.520
LotAreaK 3.480 23.689 0.000 12,253.430
Attached 0.182 0.386 0 1
SemiAttached 0.220 0.414 0 1
Irregular 0.109 0.311 0 1
Easements 0.004 0.062 0 1
YrsLastAlt 0.275 1.764 0 109
BuiltMaxFAR 0.836 0.480 0.000 22.800
SpecialZoning 0.133 0.339 0 1
Undesig 1.000 0.000 1 1
NumHist 0.411 6.233 0 365
NumHistxUndesig 0.411 6.233 0 365
TimePost 0.190 2.291 0 43
TimePostxUndesig 0.190 2.291 0 43
Black 25.462 31.263 0.100 93.500
Asian 10.373 10.311 0.300 53.900
OtherMin 11.068 9.443 0.400 57.600
MeanEarningsK 61.689 10.203 28.661 166.873
ForeignMaj 0.090 0.287 0 1
CollegeMaj 0.004 0.063 0 1
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Table 5: Statistical Summary for Designated Single-Family Homes
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 94.245 19.105 1 185
BldgAreaK 3.129 1.744 0.000 21.700
LotAreaK 4.215 4.465 0.000 64.277
Attached 0.505 0.500 0 1
SemiAttached 0.120 0.325 0 1
Irregular 0.148 0.355 0 1
Easements 0.001 0.030 0 1
YrsLastAlt 1.007 3.793 0 48
BuiltMaxFAR 0.962 0.692 0.000 4.240
SpecialZoning 0.254 0.435 0 1
Undesig 0.000 0.000 0 0
NumHist 107.293 107.424 0 428
NumHistxUndesig 0.000 0.000 0 0
TimePost 21.479 13.992 0 44
TimePostxUndesig 0.000 0.000 0 0
Black 27.303 32.750 0.400 89.200
Asian 9.188 8.284 0.400 45.900
OtherMin 11.369 9.089 2.700 55.400
MeanEarningsK 72.106 28.650 32.417 139.896
ForeignMaj 0.171 0.377 0 1
CollegeMaj 0.278 0.448 0 1
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Table 6: Estimation Results of Standard Probit Model and Marginal Effects
Dependent variable:
Alter
Probit Model Robust Error Marginal Effects
Constant −2.49273∗∗∗ −2.49273∗∗∗
(0.12501) (0.17793)
Age 0.00241∗∗∗ 0.00241∗∗∗ 0.00005∗∗∗
(0.00035) (0.00055) (0.00001)
BldgAreaK 0.06506∗∗∗ 0.06506∗∗ 0.00147∗∗∗
(0.00658) (0.03028) (0.00015)
LotAreaK 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗
(0.00049) (0.00040) (0.00001)
Attached −0.12066∗∗∗ −0.12066∗∗∗ −0.00273∗∗∗
(0.02219) (0.03383) (0.00050)
SemiAttached −0.14197∗∗∗ −0.14197∗∗∗ −0.00321∗∗∗
(0.02023) (0.03948) (0.00045)
Irregular 0.06807∗∗∗ 0.06807∗∗∗ 0.00154∗∗∗
(0.02140) (0.02373) (0.00048)
Easements −0.32824∗ −0.32824∗∗ −0.00743∗
(0.17095) (0.15019) (0.00386)
YrsLastAlt 0.00767∗∗∗ 0.00767∗∗ 0.00017∗∗∗
(0.00295) (0.00356) (0.00007)
BuiltMaxFAR −0.19383∗∗∗ −0.19383∗∗∗ −0.00439∗∗∗
(0.02137) (0.04019) (0.00048)
SpecialZoning 0.00229 0.00229 0.00005
(0.02295) (0.03544) (0.00052)
Undesig 0.06199 0.06199 0.00140
(0.08584) (0.11675) (0.00194)
NumHist 0.00073∗ 0.00073∗ 0.00002∗
(0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00001)
NumHistxUndesig −0.00035 −0.00035 −0.00001
(0.00109) (0.00077) (0.00002)
Continued on next page.
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Table 6: Estimation Results of Standard Probit Model and Marginal Effects (Cont.)
Dependent variable:
Alter
Probit Model Robust Error Marginal Effects
TimePost 0.00718∗∗ 0.00718∗∗ 0.00016∗∗
(0.00365) (0.00358) (0.00008)
TimePostxUndesig −0.00024 −0.00024 −0.00001
(0.00456) (0.00422) (0.00010)
Black −0.00278∗∗∗ −0.00278∗∗∗ −0.00006∗∗∗
(0.00032) (0.00051) (0.00001)
Asian 0.00634∗∗∗ 0.00634∗∗∗ 0.00014∗∗∗
(0.00083) (0.00110) (0.00002)
OtherMin −0.00066 −0.00066 −0.00001
(0.00093) (0.00137) (0.00002)
MeanEarningsK −0.00039 −0.00039 −0.00001
(0.00094) (0.00128) (0.00002)
ForeignMaj −0.00810 −0.00810 −0.00018
(0.02695) (0.04024) (0.00061)
CollegeMaj 0.40504∗∗∗ 0.40504∗∗∗ 0.00917∗∗∗
(0.07648) (0.10406) (0.00173)
McFadden’s Psuedo-R2 0.0356
Observations 315,627
Note:
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The robust standard errors are cluster-robust by zip code for a total of 168 zip codes.
Marginal effects calculated at the mean (MEM).
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Table 7: Estimation Results of Spatial Probit Model
Dependent variable:
Alter
SAR Probit
Constant −2.00694∗∗∗
(0.23525)
Age 0.00228∗∗∗
(0.00050)
BldgAreaK 0.05977∗∗∗
(0.00783)
LotAreaK 0.00200∗∗∗
(0.00066)
Attached −0.07618∗∗∗
(0.02739)
SemiAttached −0.12854∗∗∗
(0.03096)
Irregular 0.06897∗∗∗
(0.02625)
Easements −0.26910
(0.19699)
YrsLastAlt 0.00755∗
(0.00400)
BuiltMaxFAR −0.21077∗∗∗
(0.03794)
SpecialZoning 0.01357
(0.02432)
Undesig 0.06371
(0.09140)
NumHist 0.00036
(0.00048)
NumHistxUndesig −0.00026
(0.00121)
Continued on next page.
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Table 7: Estimation Results of Spatial Probit Model (Cont.)
Dependent variable:
Alter
SAR Probit
TimePost 0.00751∗
(0.00405)
TimePostxUndesig −0.00002
(0.00502)
Black −0.00240∗∗∗
(0.00052)
Asian 0.00510∗∗∗
(0.00109)
OtherMin −0.00085
(0.00098)
MeanEarningsK −0.00013
(0.00101)
ForeignMaj −0.01714
(0.02893)
CollegeMaj 0.27292∗∗∗
(0.09226)
rho 0.21437∗∗
(0.09376)
Observations 124,248
Note:
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 8: SAR Probit Model Direct Effects Estimate
Lower 2.5% Marginal Effect Upper 97.5% Significance
Age 0.000029451 0.000051662 0.000073483 †
BldgAreaK 0.000779789 0.001390989 0.001908739 †
LotAreaK 0.000016547 0.000047504 0.000093669 †
Attached -0.003031413 -0.001731819 -0.000582413 †
SemiAttached -0.004274472 -0.002949052 -0.001610091 †
Irregular 0.000353445 0.001572242 0.002869914 †
Easements -0.016220837 -0.006169405 0.001700551
YrsLastAlt -0.000018964 0.000169130 0.000353670
BuiltMaxFAR -0.006568870 -0.004796104 -0.003055647 †
SpecialZoning -0.000817056 0.000313908 0.001488568
Undesig -0.002658032 0.001467757 0.006221997
NumHist -0.000014771 0.000008205 0.000032762
NumHistxUndesig -0.000068032 -0.000005856 0.000050320
TimePost -0.000001718 0.000177232 0.000393011
TimePostxUndesig -0.000251324 -0.000004244 0.000231393
Black -0.000076253 -0.000054813 -0.000031901 †
Asian 0.000055753 0.000116950 0.000174605 †
OtherMin -0.000064637 -0.000017357 0.000028947
MeanEarningsK -0.000047119 -0.000001353 0.000049677
ForeignMaj -0.001781971 -0.000367144 0.001056281
CollegeMaj 0.001579034 0.006500266 0.011960738 †
Note: † indicates significance at the 95% level.
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Table 9: SAR Probit Model Indirect Effects Estimate
Lower 2.5% Marginal Effect Upper 97.5% Significance
Age 0.000004487 0.000013959 0.000031438 †
BldgAreaK 0.000143526 0.000365123 0.000738685 †
LotAreaK 0.000003540 0.000012479 0.000031289 †
Attached -0.001047329 -0.000457501 -0.000110736 †
SemiAttached -0.001714677 -0.000792618 -0.000246564 †
Irregular 0.000074890 0.000423280 0.001085449 †
Easements -0.005256784 -0.001683805 0.000339032
YrsLastAlt -0.000003815 0.000046263 0.000135868
BuiltMaxFAR -0.002980886 -0.001308056 -0.000425188 †
SpecialZoning -0.000220023 0.000073994 0.000376581
NumHist -0.000003852 0.000002037 0.000008837
Undesig -0.000631449 0.000402156 0.001837770
NumHistxUndesig -0.000017479 -0.000001211 0.000014258
TimePost -0.000000416 0.000045517 0.000117322
TimePostxUndesig -0.000074480 -0.000002440 0.000059222
Black -0.000030219 -0.000014533 -0.000005218 †
Asian 0.000011705 0.000029943 0.000056543 †
OtherMin -0.000020983 -0.000004894 0.000006423
MeanEarningsK -0.000014470 -0.000000834 0.000011543
ForeignMaj -0.000537422 -0.000107345 0.000235626
CollegeMaj 0.000473978 0.001585061 0.003149157 †
Note: † indicates significance at the 95% level.
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Table 10: SAR Probit Model Total Effects Estimate
Lower 2.5% Marginal Effect Upper 97.5% Significance
Age 0.000039828 0.000065621 0.000093612 †
BldgAreaK 0.001224794 0.001756111 0.002357280 †
LotAreaK 0.000023050 0.000059983 0.000117418 †
Attached -0.003700311 -0.002189320 -0.000789187 †
SemiAttached -0.005307408 -0.003741670 -0.002158751 †
Irregular 0.000489309 0.001995522 0.003563551 †
Easements -0.020265505 -0.007853210 0.002090899
YrsLastAlt -0.000023176 0.000215392 0.000447426
BuiltMaxFAR -0.008599580 -0.006104159 -0.004172808 †
SpecialZoning -0.001018202 0.000387902 0.001793653
Undesig -0.003225254 0.001869913 0.007628427
NumHist -0.000018475 0.000010243 0.000039907
NumHistxUndesig -0.000083016 -0.000007067 0.000062901
TimePost -0.000002262 0.000222749 0.000482114
TimePostxUndesig -0.000315753 -0.000006684 0.000282631
Black -0.000092707 -0.000069345 -0.000046386 †
Asian 0.000087287 0.000146893 0.000207958 †
OtherMin -0.000081583 -0.000022251 0.000035195
MeanEarningsK -0.000058900 -0.000002187 0.000060402
ForeignMaj -0.002216278 -0.000474489 0.001279126
CollegeMaj 0.002454685 0.008085327 0.014079201 †
Note: † indicates significance at the 95% level.
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